Focusing on students’ academic ability coupled with a flexible assessment of their talents, experiences, and potential, the policy requires admissions offi- cials to evaluate each applicant based on all the information available in the file, including a personal statement, letters of recommendation, an essay de- scribing how the applicant will contribute to Law School life and diversity, and the applicant’s undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) score. Additionally, officials must look beyond grades and scores to so-called “soft variables,” such as recommenders’ enthu- siasm, the quality of the undergraduate institution and the applicant’s essay, and the areas and difficulty of undergraduate course selection. The policy does not define diversity solely in terms of racial and ethnic status and does not restrict the types of diversity contributions eligible for “substantial weight,” but it does reaffirm the Law School’s commitment to diversity with special reference to the inclusion of African-American, Hispanic, and Native- American students, who otherwise might not be represented in the student body in meaningful numbers. By enrolling a “critical mass” of underrepre- sented minority students, the policy seeks to ensure their ability to contribute to the Law School’s character and to the legal profession.
When the Law School denied admission to petitioner Grutter, a white Michigan resident with score, she filed this suit, al- leging that respondents had discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981; that she was rejected because the Law School uses race as a “predominant” factor, giving applicants belonging to certain minority groups a significantly greater chance of admission than students with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups; and that respondents had no compelling interest to justify that use of race. . . .
. . . We have held that all racial classifications imposed by government “must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.” This means that such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests. . . .
With these principles in mind, we turn to the question whether the Law School’s use of race is justified by a compelling state interest. Before this Court, as they have throughout this litigation, respondents assert only one justification for their use of race in the admissions process: obtaining “the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.” . . .