Active Choice-plus

Again, while claims of causal connections must be viewed cautiously, the upshot is a simple utilitarian calculus: do the possible costs and other negative consequences of some sorts of restrictions on consuming pornography* outweigh the possible benefits of such restrictions – namely, reducing avoidable harms to women?

Part of our response here depends first of all on determining just what the possible costs would be – in utilitarian terms, how many negative utils would be generated by efforts at censorship or regulation? This would depend in turn, of course, on just what sorts of efforts we have in mind. For example, the UK has implemented an approach to filtering SEMs called “active choice-plus.” Under this system, customers signing up for internet access are confronted by their Internet Service Providers (ISPs) with the choice to “opt-in” to various levels of access to porn and other potentially harmful materials. That is, the default setting is to exclude these materials, thereby requiring those who want access to them to indicate as much. As might be imagined, the ISPs involved complained of the expense of installing and maintaining such filters, along with affiliated costs of developing services for allowing customers to opt in to such sites. At least some number of customers will also find the proposed necessity of taking time and action to opt in to cost at least a few negative utils – multiplied in turn by however many such customers there may be who would want to opt in.

On the other hand: how many positive utils might be gained by a potentially significant reduction in harms against women? For example, among other impulses toward the development of active choice-plus were the claims of MP Ann Coffey – namely, that there has been a “surge” of sexual groping and manhandling of young girls in the UK: around one-third of sixth-form girls have been targets. Coffey, moreover, squarely blamed this rise of sexual aggression against young girls on internet pornography* fostering “distorted” sexual attitudes among teenage boys. So: how many positive utils can we assign – presumably a very large number – to the young girls who would no longer be victimized in this way should stronger blocks be placed on access to internet pornography*?

This example brings forward three of the critical reasons why applying a utilitarian cost–benefit analysis in practice is so difficult. The first question is: how far can we be confident of our predictions of the outcomes of our possible choices? That is, can we be confident of the predictions on either side – whether of high negative and/or of high positive consequences of imposing new controls on access to online SEMs?