New selves, new “privacies?” These dramatic changes in our conceptions of selfhood, privacy, and privacy law are part of a still larger discussion. Not surprisingly, there is considerable debate among philosophers in information and computing ethics regarding the nature and possible justifications of privacy, justifications for its protection, etc. Herman Tavani helpfully summarizes three basic kinds of privacy. The first of these is accessibility privacy (freedom from unwarranted intrusion). This notion of privacy, also formulated as the right to “being let alone” or “being free from intrusion,” was defended in the landmark paper by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis – who thereby made the first explicit claim in the United States that privacy exists as a legal right. Second, decisional privacy is defined as a freedom from the interference from others in “one’s personal choices, plans, and decisions”. Such privacy, Tavani points out, has been crucial in the US context in defending freedom of choice regarding contraception, abortion, and euthanasia. Finally, informational privacy is a matter of our having the ability to control information about us that we consider to be personal.